The photograph of the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) General Sir Edmund Allenby entering Jerusalem on 11 December 1917 is one of the most iconic of the First World War and the British effort in the war. The capture of Jerusalem offered the British government and public some relief at a time of setbacks and disappointments on the Western Front. The capture of Jerusalem was a tangible, significant and symbolic gain, and it was a clear sign that the Turkish army was being defeated. This historic moment of British forces entering the Holy City has, however, not been matched by historical interest, and the Palestine Front in general in the First World War has often been described as a 'forgotten front'.
1
Although interest is picking up, albeit gradually over the past 20 years, and with new works being produced during 2014, the immediate military operations that led to the capture and consolidation of Jerusalem have not received a great deal of scholarly attention. The capture of Jerusalem was a hard-fought campaign. The city was gained at some cost to the EEF, and adjusting to the environment of the Judaean Hills was also a considerable challenge. This chapter seeks to explore how effectively the EEF adjusted to the changing conditions of the campaign, and will argue that the EEF's doctrine and training did allow it to cope with the new environment well, but the campaign did also reveal some tactical weaknesses that EEF commanders were identifying. The chapter will first outline the current areas of neglect in histories of the Palestine campaign, as well as the key features of the battles for Jerusalem. It will then evaluate EEF performance, examining the constraints it faced, and how effectively the organisation and individual commanders coped with these challenges.
Debates on the Palestine campaign
Traditional operational histories of the Palestine campaign have largely been criticised on two key grounds. First, as noted, they have largely centred on generalship of the main commanders, and in particular Allenby.
3 Early historians of the campaign, such as Archibald Wavell and Raymond Savage, have portrayed Allenby as the central figure in turning around the fortunes of the EEF and its success from late 1917 onwards. Allenby is traditionally credited for modernising the EEF, especially for boosting its morale, and for ensuring that the attack at Third Gaza was well supported by artillery.
5 This view has undergone some revision. Jonathan Newell has argued that our perception of Allenby in the Palestine campaign has been shaped by those with particular interests in portraying him in a positive light. Wavell, for example, was Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Sir William Robertson's liaison officer with Allenby. 6 The questioning of Allenby's generalship by Clive Garsia, and later by Newell, has derived in a large part from his decision to concentrate his efforts at Beersheba rather than Gaza for the late 1917 offensive.
7 Jonathan Newell also argued that the achievements and preparations made by Allenby's predecessor, General Sir Archibald Murray, have been underplayed. 8 However, Newell's focus on Murray meant that historical focus still centred on the high command, and this continues to be a dominant theme. Moreover, despite attempts to challenge the early works, Allenby's reputation has remained intact, although modern scholars take a more nuanced, balanced approach. For example, James Kitchen has questioned the very notion of a decline in EEF after the Second Battle of Gaza.
9
The second key criticism is the overemphasis by historians on the role of the cavalry at the expense of the achievements of the infantry and artillery. As well as reflecting the different characters of warfare between the Western and Palestine Fronts, it also reflected the preoccupations of and debate among inter-war theorists about the role of manoeuvre and the roles of cavalry and mechanised forces in British doctrine.
10 This focus on the cavalry has not gone unnoticed by infantry veterans of the theatre, and within the correspondence of the official historian of the Palestine campaign, Cyril Falls, are complaints, not least from XXI Corps
